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Abstract
Through publically agreed laws that correspond to a common set of 
public restrictions, the ‘people as a sovereign body’ serves to protect 
against violations of individual liberty and despotic power. Where no 
such common body exists, individuals are deprived of this protection. In 
such cases, individuals must obey without liberty, while those in power 
command under a state of license. Neoliberal theorists maintain that any 
common personality, with its corresponding set of public and arbitrary 
positive and negative restrictions on liberty, undermines individual 
liberty. Neoliberal theory only allows for private restrictions on liberty. 
Against these neoliberal assumptions, we argue that rejecting public 
restrictions on liberty does not promote individual liberty. To the 
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contrary, it creates conditions in which free individuals become servile 
and political inequality becomes entrenched, where citizens are divided 
into those who obey and those who command. Tracing the consequences 
of neoliberalism, we argue that unless we take seriously both the people 
as a political category and the right to equal and reciprocal coercion, 
individual liberty will be at risk. We also argue that neoliberalism 
ultimately leads to the total exclusion of certain citizens under the veil of 
full liberty. With the vanishing of the people’s will comes the utter 
disappearance of certain citizens, who live in the spontaneous society as 
if they were stateless or lawless persons. To better understand the 
connections between the rejection of the concept of the people, private 
restrictions on liberty and the fostering of the servile citizen, this paper 
considers the political philosophy of Hayek and Nozick. It also 
considers key ideas from Locke and Kant—theorists who, despite the 
differences between their philosophical perspectives, and despite the fact 
that they both provided crucial inspiration for Hayek’s political 
economy and Nozick’s libertarianism, stressed the protective role of the 
people with regard to individual liberty.
Introduction
Through publically agreed laws that correspond to a common set of public 
restrictions, the ‘people as a sovereign body’ serves to protect against 
violations of individual liberty and despotic power (Locke, 1679 (1960); 
Kant, 1793 (1977)). Where no such common body exists, individuals are 
deprived of this protection. In such cases, individuals must obey without 
liberty, while those in power command under a state of license, i.e., a state 
of unrestricted liberty. Neoliberal theorists maintain that any common 
personality, with its corresponding set of public restrictions on liberty, 
undermines individual liberty (Hayek, 1976; Nozick, 1974). Therefore, in 
addition to promoting the idea of private, atomized individuals and 
denying the existence of “the people” (Hayek, 1976; Nozick, 1974), 
neoliberal theory permits only private restrictions (positive and negative) 
on liberty (Hayek, 1976; Nozick, 1974).
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Against this neoliberal assumption (Hayek, 1976; Nozick, 1974), we shall 
argue that rejecting the concept of the people and public restrictions on 
liberty while preserving the general law, its protective function, and 
coercive institutions and instruments for enforcing neoliberal law poses a 
serious threat to individual liberty and ultimately risks reducing the 
majority of free individuals to servile—and in some cases 
lawless—persons.
The literature has already demonstrated the incompatibility between 
neoliberalism and the notion of the people as a political category and 
reality (Brown, 2015; Dean, 2008). The impact of neoliberalism’s 
exclusion of the people and its reliance on the concept of publicity without 
a public has also been demonstrated (Queiroz, 2017). Related to this, the 
literature has addressed how neoliberalism fosters the development of a 
docile and disciplined citizenry (Foucault, 2008). Nonetheless, the political 
consequences of the exclusion of the people and the protective role it plays 
in the preservation of the political state—namely the transformation of free 
individuals into servile, and ultimately lawless, persons—has yet to be 
addressed, in particular from a political-philosophical point of view.
The importance of this issue is clear. There has been much emphasis on the 
economic nature of neoliberalism, which has obscured the fact that, more 
than an economic position, neoliberalism is a political outlook and reality 
(Bruff, 2014). Although neoliberalism has become deeply tied to 
economics (Hall, 2011; Read, 2009), this is mainly due to the fact that its 
theoretical understanding of the state as a political institution is made in 
analogy with the economic market and the subsequent political redefinition 
of the latter’s aims and scope (Foucault, 2008). Thus, without neglecting 
the significance of neoliberal economic analysis, in shifting the focus to 
neoliberalism’s political character we aim to disclose its political-
philosophical foundations and to translate its allegedly purely economic 
aspects to the political sphere. As we will see, the imposition of fiscal 
equilibrium, fiscal consolidation, cuts to social security, the privatization 
of public property, the liberalization of collective bargaining, and the 
shrinking of pensions (Barro, 2009) are connected not only to the rise of 
poverty and inequality but also to the transformation of free citizens into 
dependent and servile persons.
The underlying philosophical principles formulated in Hayek’s political 
economy, political philosophy and legal theory, as well as in Nozick’s 
libertarianism, have spilled over into politics. Although, as empirical 
studies frequently show, there is always a gap between theoretical 
statements and practical reality, these principles now provide, at a national 
and international level, the law’s substantive content (Brown, 2015; Gill, 
1998; Hall, 2011; Klein, 2007; Overbeek, 1993).
For these reasons, we do not intend to evaluate the “exegetical” value of 
Hayek’s and Nozick’s philosophical views (for example Hayek’s mistaken 
reading of Kant’s ethical and political philosophy; Gray, 1989). At the 
same time, we cannot here explore the important material basis of 
neoliberal ideology, namely concrete neoliberal activities, processes and 
powerful neoliberal social and political forces, such as multinational 
corporations (Brown, 2015; Gill, 1998; Hall, 2011; Harvey, 2005; Klein, 
2007; Overbeek, 1993). Instead, we aim to show that the philosophical 
assumptions underlying Hayek’s political economy and Nozick’s 
libertarianism allow us to clarify the connection between the exclusion of 
the people as a political category and neoliberalism’s promotion of a 
servile citizenry.
To better understand this connection, this paper will consider the Lockean 
and Kantian concepts of the people. Despite the differences between 
Locke’s and Kant’s political philosophies (Gray, 1989; Williams, 1994), 
for both thinkers the people serves the function of protecting individual 
liberty against despotic power, a condition which is commonly referred to 
as political obligation under liberty. Hayek and Nozick explicitly refer to 
the Lockean and Kantian foundations of their views, for example the 
Kantian universalization test for establishing the validity of the abstract 
rules of the market state (Hayek, 1976). Nozick’s use of the Kantian 
understanding of the person as an end in itself to justify the rejection of 
substantive principles of justice (Nozick, 1974) provides an additional 
reason to consider Locke’s and Kant’s conceptions of the people in detail.
There are of course important differences between our current social, 
political and technological context, which is characterized by 
globalization, and Locke and Kant’s modern nation states. We ought also 
to consider the differences between how we conceive of the people, e.g., 
whether we define peoples in terms of national commonality (Miller, 2000) 
or whether we ought to stress the role of democratic politics in creating 
this sense of political belonging (Habermas, 2008). Equally significant is 
the fact that, contrary to neoliberalism, Locke’s liberalism depends on 
homo politicus and juridicus rather than homo economicus, which 
generates significant tensions between his rights-based view and modern 
views based on interests (Foucault, 2008). Equally, we wish to overlook 
neither Locke’s and Kant’s controversial statements and practices, for 
example Kant’s exclusion of non-property-owners from the social contract 
(Kersting, 1992), nor the limits of Locke’s and Kant’s theoretical 
constructions of political personality (Badiou, 2016). The weaknesses of 
past democracies, expressed in the exclusion of woman from equal 
citizenship, the existence of slavery, and contemporary populist 
perversions of democracy, do not entail that we must abandon the ideal of 
democratic political power, however. The negative aspects of Locke’s and 
Kant’s political philosophies should not erase their strong commitment, 
from a liberal perspective, to the importance of the concept of the people 
when it comes to protecting individual liberty.
Finally, we do not wish to ignore past conceptions of the people, such as 
Greco-Roman conceptions, republican conceptions (Cicero, 1999; 
Habermas, 2000; Rousseau, 1762 (1964)), Marxist conceptions (Badiou, 
2016), and other current alternatives. Despite their differences, they share 
certain features with the liberal approach, such as assigning a protective 
role to the people. In the face of the political consequences of 
neoliberalism’s exclusion of the people, we should appeal to what Rawls 
(1993) calls overlapping consensus, i.e., agreement on the people as a 
political category on different grounds.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides a brief presentation 
of the main concepts and neoliberalism’s rejection of public restrictions on 
liberty and the right to equal and reciprocal coercion. In the second 
section, we show that, contrary to neoliberal assumptions, far from 
fostering individual liberty, the exclusively private restriction of liberty 
implies a political distinction between those who obey and those who rule. 
It also entails the division of citizens into those who obey and those who 
command, where the latter are given unequal protection by the government 
and thus an unequal share in the public coercive power. Similarly, it 
involves the introduction of two familiar political categories, originally 
deployed in neoliberal political society: self-serfdom on the one hand and 
invisible, voiceless citizenship on the other. At the end of the paper, we 
provide a brief account of the protective role of the people as a political 
body when it comes to individual liberty. We show that by ensuring the 
equal and reciprocal right of coercion, the people as a body protects 
individual liberty.
The people vs. the private coercion of liberty 
under neoliberalism
As an imprecise and nebulous concept, there is no single “pure” form of 
neoliberalism. Instead, there are varied articulations that make up an 
extraordinarily messy amalgam of neoliberal ideas and policies at multiple 
sites (Latin America, Europe, China; Harvey, 2005), on multiple scales 
(national, international, transnational, global; Brown, 2015; Hall, 2011; 
Klein, 2007; Overbeek, 1993), and within the many versions of the welfare 
state (Kus, 2006). Additionally, according to England and Ward’s (2016) 
taxonomy, neoliberalism can be thought of as a form of statecraft that 
promotes the reduction of government spending while increasing economic 
completion (Mudge, 2008), or as a form of governmentality that comprises 
social, cultural and economic practices that constitute new spaces and 
subjects (Foucault, 2008). In addition, neoliberalism can be seen as a 
reaction to the disenchantment identified by Weber, (1978) following the 
rise of bureaucracy. Neoliberalism expresses a kind of re-enchantment 
with the exclusively individual rational actor, who claims a non-alienable 
space of liberty against a bureaucratic “iron cage”. Although some see 
neoliberalism as a privatized version of economic and bureaucratic 
despotism (Lorenz, 2012) or as a totalizing global bureaucracy (Hickel, 
2016), this re-enchantment can explain the enthusiastic endorsement of 
neoliberal principles by a wide spectrum of political and ideological 
forces, for example by the Labour party under Blair in Great Britain, the 
SPD under Schröder in Germany, and followers of Pinochet in Chile.
Finally, neoliberalism has been viewed as a conception of the world, or a 
“total view of reality” (Ramey, 2015, p. 3), which is meant to be applied to 
the political realm and the entirety of human existence. Integrated into 
common sense, its main ideas stem from the everyday experience of 
buying and selling commodities on the market, a model that is then 
transferred to society. As a total view of reality, neoliberalism entails “a 
new understanding of human nature and social existence [and] the way in 
which human beings make themselves and are made subjects” (Read, 2009, 
p. 28; see also Foucault, 2008).
While acknowledging the disparate criteria for defining and assessing 
neoliberal theory and practice, we maintain that neoliberalism is a political 
outlook and reality (Bruff, 2014) which has evolved in part in accordance 
with the framework of the theoretical premises of Hayek’s, (1976) political 
economy and Nozick’s, (1974) philosophical libertarianism. For instance, 
neoliberal theoretical principles now provide, at a national and 
international level, substantive content to political constitutions 
(McCluskey, 2003), the establishment of laws governing the executive 
(Foucault, 2008; Read, 2009), and the reformulation of laws governing 
citizens (LeBaron, 2008; McCluskey, 2003; Supiot, 2013, p. 141; 
Wacquant, 1999). They also shape our comprehension of the world and 
ourselves (for example the reduction of the citizen to an entrepreneur; 
Peters, 2016). Thus, although there is no purely neoliberal society or 
state—neoliberalism evolves within various societies in different ways (see 
Harvey, 2005)—neoliberal political theory allows us to clarify the political 
premises that underlie the disparate versions of neoliberalism.
In preserving the political state, neoliberal individualistic premises do not 
accommodate the notion of the people, i.e., the citizens of a given political 
community or a unitary political body (demos or populus), understood as 
an ultimate intentional lawmaker or sovereign (Locke, 1679 (1960)). The 
category of the people is a political criterion, which refers to the main act 
of the people’s sovereignty: their giving law to themselves, in the form of 
rights and duties (Locke, 1679 (1960); Kant, 1793 (1977); Rousseau, 1762 
(1964); Sieyes, 1789 (1989)). Putting to the side the relationship between 
political (Dahl, 1998; Rawls, 1999; Sieyes, 1789 [1989]) and ethnic 
(Habermas, 2000, 2008) criteria, this act unifies individuals who belong to 
different ethnicities, cultures, and linguistic traditions. The results of this 
act are the civic, political and social human rights which have traditionally 
been the privileged content of the laws of peoples (Locke, 1679 (1960); 
Kant, 1793 (1977); Marshall, 1950; Rawls, 1971, 1999).
It is true that women and slaves have historically been excluded from the 
category of the people. It is also undeniable that such exclusion has not 
been completely overcome and that new categories of exclusion have 
emerged, such as ageism and digital exclusion. Important political 
differences within peoples on the axes of class (Badiou, 2016), gender 
(Elstain, 1981), race (Wilson, 2012), and citizenship (Pike 2001) remain. 
Nonetheless, the content of the laws of peoples has provided political 
criteria for denouncing and reducing, if not eliminating, these exclusions 
(e.g., in South Africa with the end of Apartheid).
Despite the complexity of the relationship between the state and the 
sovereignty of the people (Habermas, 2008), the political criterion stresses 
the subordination of the state to the sovereign people. It also points to the 
reformulation of the powers of states, “specifying that their legislators 
must not make certain laws, or must advance certain objectives” (Pyke, 
2001, p. 205). For example, instead of exclusively preserving peace or 
economic and financial efficiency, states ought to ensure the well-being of 
their citizens. In the absence of such restrictions, the overestimation of 
states’ economic goals (such as low inflation, the removal of trade barriers 
and foreign currency control, and minimal regulation of the economic 
labor market) can result in the undermining of welfare at the national 
(Brodie, 2007) and international level (Beck, 2002).
Some argue that nation states provide a criterion for determining political 
belonging (Miller, 2000). However, the political criterion points to the fact 
that one’s relation to a given nation state should be based on common 
laws, not ethnic or cultural differences. Rawls’s, (1999) liberal approach to 
international relationships argues against cosmopolitan principles of justice 
that are blind to the political (and moral) differences between peoples, for 
example the difference between liberal and decent peoples, where the 
former is based on an individualistic tradition and the latter on a 
‘corporative’ tradition. Despite the perils of extending sovereign power to 
the global order (e.g., populism) and people’s incomprehension of the full 
import of economic and political factors (Pike 2001), this order should 
respect the sovereignty of peoples. Neoliberalism’s “global policy of 
boundary removal” (Beck, 2002, p. 78) undermines the sovereignty of the 
people (Beck, 2002; Overbeek, 1993; Pike, 2001). Indeed, the growth of 
international law affects domestic legal systems, limiting the political 
choices of legislators and voters, and competition in globalized markets 
does not allow nations or states to regulate their industries and workplaces 
(Pike, 2001). As Hickel notes, for example, financial liberalization creates 
conditions under which “investors can conduct moment-by-moment 
referendums on decisions made by voters and governments around the 
world, bestowing their favor on countries that facilitate profit 
maximization while punishing those that prioritize other concerns, like 
decent wages” (Hickel, 2016, p. 147).
Although pPeoples are the main ‘actors’ in the international and global 
arena, their sovereignty, along with their constitutional power, cannot 
dispense with common laws. Despite the crucial issue of the existence of 
mechanisms for enforcing those laws (Pike, 2001), human rights such as 
freedom from slavery and serfdom, mass murder and genocide can provide 
their content (Rawls, 1999). Although the political manipulation of the law 
by national-hegemonic principles (Beck, 2002) and the enforcement issue 
(Lane, et al. 2006) must be kept in mind, the human rights approach is 
relevant to Locke’s and Kant’s concepts of the people. Although tThere is 
a difference between the national order underlying Locke’s and Kant’s 
approaches to the sovereignty of the people and our contemporary 
international and global order, human rights can create, at the national, 
international and global level, a sense of political belonging (Habermas, 
2008; Lane et al. 2006; Rawls, 1999). As political criteria, human rights 
preclude resolving persistent political conflicts on the basis of ethnic or 
national criteria, as occurs with populism and nationalism, respectively.
Given this intricate theoretical framework, as well as the complexity of the 
notion of a sovereign people (Butler, 2016; Morgan, 1988; Morris, 2000), 
we stress that whatever its scope, the sovereign people plays a protective 
role with regard to citizens’ liberties in general and against despotic 
power in particular (Locke, 1679 (1960); Kant, 1793 (1977)). Locke, 
(1679 (1960)) and Kant, (1793 ([1977)) assume that the sovereign people 
guarantees individual liberty in any human association. Both thinkers hold 
both that human associations (or societies) of free persons cannot deny the 
political facts of power, obedience and command (Locke, 1679 ([1960); 
Kant, 1793 (1977)) and that, in natural (rather than political) conditions, 
individual liberty is unrestricted. Since in the state of nature it is possible 
for one to obey unconditionally, having only duties, while the other in turn 
commands unconditionally, having only rights, the unrestrictedly obedient 
enjoy no protection against unrestricted power, at least concerning their 
right to life (Locke, 1679 ([1960); Kant, 1793 (1977)). From this 
perspective, i.e., from the perspective of individual liberty, the practical (as 
opposed to theoretical) challenge consists in conceiving of an alliance 
between individuals that does not undermine their individual liberty. The 
people as a political body expresses precisely this alliance: an inter-
protective construction that replaces the state of unconditional obedience 
and command.
Following the controversial model of the contractual act (Gough, 1957), 
individuals transfer to the political power their unrestricted natural right to 
liberty. This transfer transforms them into “one people, one body politic” 
(Locke, 1679 (1960), II, p. 89). As members of the people, individuals 
equally consent to restricting their liberty under a political order and to 
preserving an equal coercive power, which prevents them from being 
reduced to servile persons and, correlatively, prevents any one of their 
numbers from becoming a despotic lord (Locke, 1679 (1960); Kant, 1793 
(1977)). As such, they establish public law—a system of laws for a people, 
i.e., an aggregate of human beings, or an aggregate of peoples (Kant, 1793 
(1977))—which allows them to live in a lawful state.
Through public law, i.e., laws based on their will, the people provides to 
each individual a unique set of liberties with regard to the use of material 
goods and imposes on each a unique set of restrictions (Locke, 1679 
(1960); Kant, 1793 (1977)). When pursuing their personal well-being, as 
members of the people, individuals cannot ignore this common set of 
rights and restrictions. When pursuing their well-being, individuals are 
also, but not exclusively, bound to demands that are independent of their 
individual interests.
Public vs. private law
Neoliberal theory and practice does not preclude a common law (Buchanan 
and Tullock, 1962; Hayek, 1976). The common law that it involves is not, 
however, a law of the people that provides liberties (rights) and imposes a 
unique set of restrictions (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Hayek, 1976; 
Nozick, 1974). Indeed, neoliberal political theory does not allow for the 
transformation of individual personalities or isolated natural selves into a 
collective or single public, viewed as the ultimate intentional lawmaker, 
which is the model we find, for example, in Locke, (1679 (1960)), Kant, 
(1793 (1977)), and Rawls, (1971). In Nozick’s political theory, when 
private persons establish a contract to govern their use of the possessions 
over which they have a private right (Nozick, 1974)—this conception of 
rights includes both material possessions and natural talents—they are 
always separate units that remain separate even when they form 
associations (Nozick, 1974). They do not constitute a common person 
subject to common legislation that defines and regulates political authority 
and applies equally to all persons. This mirrors Hayek’s suggestion that it 
is absurd to speak of rights as claims which no one has an obligation to 
obey, or even to exercise (Hayek, 1976). On this view, human rights result 
from personal interests, and persons cannot be bound to claims that are 
independent of their private interests. These claims presuppose a public 
obligation (or the possibility of coercion), which involves a political 
organization in which decision-makers act as collective agents: as 
members of a people rather than individuals. Yet on the neoliberal 
conception, collective deliberation of this sort limits, and even undermines, 
individual liberty (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962; Hayek, 1976; Nozick, 
1974), leading to oppression (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962), if not to 
serfdom (Hayek, 1960).
Viewed from the neoliberal standpoint as a meaningless or mystical
political category (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962)—“a fairy tale” (Hayek, 
1960, p. 35)—the political deliberation of the people imposes obligations 
on individuals, undermining their liberty and well-being. The people as a 
political body is based on the supposition that someone (the people) can 
intentionally prevent or promote certain results, which, via end-rules, 
guiding organizations can compel individuals to attain. In addition to their 
“epistemological impossibility” (Gray, 1993, p. 38), 
however—individuals’ multiple interactions produce unpredictable and 
unforeseen results—end-rules interfere with individual liberty and worsen 
the positions of all (Hayek, 1976), in particular those who are better off 
(Nozick, 1974). Interference (or intervention), which is “by definition an 
[…] act of coercion” (Hayek, 1976, p. 129), is “properly applied to specific 
orders [that aim] at particular results” (Hayek, 1976, p. 128). Moreover, 
interference and intervention occurs “if we changed the position of any 
particular part in a manner which is not in accord with the general 
principle of its operation” (Hayek, 1976, p. 128).
The general principle of the operation of the spontaneous society is 
negative liberty, or “the absence of a particular obstacle—coercion by 
other men” (Hayek, 1960, p. 18) in one’s pursuit of maximal individual 
well-being. Requiring that the situation of the less well off be improved via 
the principle of the equality of opportunity, for example, involves 
restricting individual liberty in order to improve the situations of others 
(Hayek, 1960, 1976; Nozick, 1974). This improvement is thought to be 
unacceptable because, in addition to presupposing that we can determine 
the circumstances under which individuals pursue their aims, binding 
persons to claims that are independent of their private interests constitutes 
an interference in their liberty (Hayek, 1976). Even if it is admitted that the 
principle of equal opportunity entails neither complete control over the 
circumstances in which individuals pursue their well-being (Rawls, 1971), 
nor equality of results (Rawls, 1971), nor the worsening of the position of 
the better-off (see Rawls’s principle of difference, Rawls, 1971), the fact 
that it involves changing the positions of individuals via a public rule 
means that it constitutes the imposition of an illegitimate obligation on 
individuals (Hayek, 1960; 1976; Nozick, 1974). The public law limits the 
overall sum of well-being—the greater the privatization, the greater the 
well-being—and restricts the unlimited intensification of individuals’ 
purely private interests (see Hayek’s, (1976) and Nozick’s, (1974) 
criticism of the utilitarian and Rawlsian theories of social justice). 
“Inconsistent” (Hayek, 1976, p. 129) with individual liberties from the 
perspective of negative liberty and with the unlimited intensification of 
individuals’ purely private interests, public rules are transformed into 
private rules (commands or end-rules).
On the neoliberal view, the pursuit of individual ends ought to be based on 
historical principles (Nozick, 1974) or Hayek’s abstract rules, which only 
set out the procedures for acquiring and preserving individual well-being 
and which do not refer to a common purpose, such as social justice: 
“Freedom under the law rests on the contention that when we obey laws, in 
the sense of general abstract rules irrespective of their application to us; we 
are not subject to another man’s will and are therefore free” (Hayek, 1960, 
p. 11). Under this negative conception of liberty, abstract rules allow for 
the improvement of “the chances of all in the pursuit of their aims”; they 
are therefore truly public rules:
To regard only the public law as serving general welfare 
and the private law as protecting only the selfish interests of 
the individuals would be a complete inversion of the truth: 
it is an error to believe that only actions, which deliberately 
aim at common purposes, serve common needs. The fact is 
rather that what the spontaneous order of society provides 
for us is more important for everyone, and therefore for the 
general welfare, than most of the particular services which 
the organization of government can provide, excepting only 
the security provided by the enforcement of the rules of just 
conduct. (Hayek, 1960, p. 132 emphasis added).
Neoliberal “public” rules are therefore abstract rules that exclude common 
concern. Organizations “sanction” the rights resulting from individuals’ 
interactions under abstract rules (Hayek, 1976). This means not only that 
governments ought to mirror that order—they cannot provide any rights of 
themselves—but also that the judicial system ought to be redesigned to fit 
with the Great Society. Indeed, Hayek critiques the enslavement of law by 
“false economics” (Hayek, 1960, p. 67), i.e., economics that are dependent 
on the existence of public goods, and “prophetically” foresees the 
disappearance of this law in the spontaneous society (Hayek, 1960). Other 
neoliberal theorists have conceived of the neoliberal impact on law in 
similar terms, envisaging a legal system based on “true neoliberal 
economics”, which transforms the law into a bond “oblig[ing] one party to 
behave according to the expectations of the other” (Supiot, 2013, p. 141; 
see also LeBaron, 2008; McCluskey, 2003; Wacquant, 1999).
This model cannot accommodate the idea of a public person, the people, to 
whom individuals belong; indeed, the role of ultimate intentional 
lawmaker is taken from the people and given to the spontaneous order, the 
Great or Open Society. Understood in analogy with the economic market, 
and equating to abstract rules applied to “an unknown number of future 
instances” (Hayek, 1976: 35), this spontaneous order constitutes the 
sovereign lawmaker (Queiroz, 2017).
Neoliberal political intervention under private law
Under the negative conception of liberty, individual freedom is compatible 
with impediments and constraints (liberty is not bare license, which 
ultimately undermines negative liberty; Berlin, 1958). Abstract rules allow 
for private restrictions on liberty, and neoliberal governmental 
organizations ought to ensure that any restrictions on liberty are limited to 
the private realm. Neoliberal theorists do not understand this protection as 
a form of intervention or interference, however. Hayek, (1960), for 
example, argues for this notion by establishing a distinction between 
repairing and intervening. When a person oils a clock, they are merely 
repairing it, securing the conditions required for its proper functioning. In 
turn, when a person changes “the position of any particular part in a 
manner which is not in accord with the general principle of its operation” 
(Hayek, 1976, p. 128), for example by shifting the clock’s hands, this 
counts as intervention or interference. In other words, just as oiling a clock 
provides the conditions required for its proper functioning, so 
governmental protection of the private scope of restrictions on liberty 
allows for the proper functioning of the Great Society. Both merely create 
the conditions under which individual wellbeing can be maintained, if not 
increased. In turn, just as shifting the hands of a clock is not in accord with 
the general principle of the clock’s operation, public rules, which impose 
illegitimate obligations on individuals, constitute an intervention into the 
functioning of the spontaneous society.
When establishing the particular character of organizations’ rules, and 
excluding “the security provided by the enforcement of the rules of the just 
conduct” (Hayek, 1960, p. 132), this enforcement means that neoliberal 
politicians intentionally intervene, but only to prevent the auto-destruction 
of the “mechanism” itself. They permanently adjust the rules to the 
neoliberal common law.
Consider a situation in which two people, A and B, are involved in 
cooperative activity and in which both establish a common rule to 
safeguard the maximization of their interests. Under this rule, A and B 
both contribute to the maximization of their own well-being. Although it 
accepts the interdependence of individuals when pursuing their personal 
well-being, neoliberal reparation does not allow for a common right to the 
results of that cooperative interdependence (Hayek, 1976; Nozick, 1974). 
In denying the existence of a public person, a public will, and in ultimately 
challenging the idea that there is a common right to a share in the total 
well-being that results from the contributions of all, neoliberalism not only 
allows, but also requires, that one party has a claim to the exclusively 
private enjoyment of the benefits of their mutual relationship. Accordingly, 
neoliberal repair (a metaphor for neoliberal government) ought to remove 
public law, which allows for the common right to well-being, and should 
replace it with private law. In this way, the proper functioning of the Great 
Society—which permits the unrestricted preservation and increasing of 
individuals’ private wellbeing—can be reestablished. The resulting 
intensification of poverty and inequality (Greer, 2014; Matsaganis and 
Leventi 2014; Stiglitz, 2013), the diminishing security of employment and 
income (Clayton and Pontusson, 1998; Stiglitz, 2013), and growing 
authoritarianism (Brown, 2015; Bruff, 2014; Kreuder-Sonnen and Zangl, 
2015; Orphanides, 2014; Schmidt and Thatcher, 2014) are not problems in 
themselves. To the contrary, to the extent that it undermines individual 
liberty, any attempt to redress these effects violates the law of the 
neoliberal state, which, Hayek would say, is based on “true economics”. 
Accordingly, when choosing between the intensification of poverty and 
inequality and allegiance to the right of non-interference, non-interference 
must prevail, thus preventing political and social action to reduce (or 
compensate for) poverty and inequality. Notwithstanding the underlying 
theoretical debate on the legitimacy and justice of the acquisition of 
private rights (Hayek, 1976; Marx, 2000; Nozick, 1974; Rawls, 1971, 
1993), enforcing the rules of the Open Society deprives one part of that 
society of the right to their well-being and to their contribution to the 
general well-being. Under the neoliberal model of government and law, 
certain citizens are deprived of the right to enjoy the public goods that 
result from their collective activity, while others enjoy a private right to 
goods that result from the contribution of all. Since those who benefit are 
not able to acknowledge the contribution of others, they erase it and 
privatize the public law. This privatization shows that the neoliberal trinity 
of privatization, flexibilization and deregulation ultimately results from the 
original privatization of the public or common law.
Private restrictions on liberty and coercive 
positive liberty
Aside from the controversy concerning the epistemological value of the 
distinction between negative and positive liberty (Berlin, 1958 [1997]; 
Gray, 1993; Rawls, 1971, 1993; Taylor, 1979), theoretical disagreement 
about their meanings (Taylor, 1979), and the caricatures by which they are 
often understood (e.g., positive liberty as a form of being “forced-to-be-
free”; Taylor, 1979), governmental protection of private restrictions on 
liberty under neoliberalism shows that neoliberal political theory does not 
dispense with the coercive feature of positive liberty (see Gray, 1989 for a 
reading of Hayekian freedom as more than merely negative).
This not a negligible issue; neoliberal political philosophers establish a 
relationship between the main act of the people’s sovereignty, or its 
constitutional power—establishing a public law that provides to each 
person a unique set of liberties with regard to the use of material goods and 
imposes on each a unique set of restrictions—and the violation of 
individual liberty (Buchanan 1985; Hayek, 1976; Nozick, 1974). The 
replacement of the people’s sovereignty with the spontaneous order is 
thought to be justifiable because “when we obey laws, in the sense of 
general abstract rules irrespective of their application to us, we are not 
subject to another man’s will and are therefore free” (Hayek, 1960, p. 11). 
When arguing against the oppressive nature of the rules that issue from the 
people, neoliberalism relies on the positive meaning of liberty (freedom to 
be one’s own “master”; Berlin, 1958 (1997)). A private right to a good
that results from the (perhaps unequal) contribution of all constitutes a 
coercive act of positive liberty—“coercing others for their own sake, in 
their, not my, interest” (Berlin, 1958 (1997), p. 397). Similarly, the 
imposition of that right on society as a whole through legislation, including 
those who have been deprived of their well-being, also constitutes positive 
coercion. Citizens who are deprived of their well-being must simply accept 
the neoliberal diktat, i.e., the transference of their well-being to the few 
(Stiglitz, 2013). In a paternalistic way—according to Berlin, (1958 
(1997)), positive liberty is always paternalistic in some sense—neoliberal 
politicians argue that there is no alternative (TINA) to neoliberal political 
legislation (the government knows best). Consequently, under the veil of 
state juridical and political violence, neoliberal politicians present 
governmental rules as an ultimatum, precluding consent, i.e., forcing 
individuals to give up their political right to challenge that deprivation (see 
the political meaning of TINA, Queiroz, 2017). The rejection of all public 
right, i.e., the exclusion of peoples, introduces into the core of the theory 
(and its practice) the despotic feature that neoliberalism attributes to the 
general will. In other words, the neoliberal political order mirrors the 
despotic nature that neoliberals attribute to the meaningless or mystical
general will (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962).
The neoliberal ultimatum not only protects those citizens who apparently 
do not need the state’s intervention but also ensures that the law only 
protects their interests (which constitutes the privatization of legal 
protection). Neoliberal theorists understand public rules as means of 
protection, as if private interests were not highly dependent on law. 
Indeed, Nozick’s distinction between ‘public’, “paternalistically regulated” 
citizens (Nozick, 1974, p. 14) and free citizens, who dispense with state 
intervention, obscures the existence of private, “paternalistically 
regulated” citizens. These citizens are protected by the reparations of 
neoliberal “public” law. In addition, however, rather than accepting the 
collective protective scope of the law, they demand a monopoly on it. 
Although neoliberalism casts them as utterly independent actors—lone 
Robinson Crusoes—they are highly dependent not only on the 
contributions of others for their well-being but also on the legal positive 
attribution of rights law. The negative conception of liberty requires that 
political power positively and unequally provide certain means (rights and 
duties) to certain citizens. This shows that unless there is a common law to 
prevent others from interfering with one’s liberty and to provide certain 
means, negative liberty is an empty claim.
Insofar as the protective function of the government and the positive 
attribution of rights law include both legislative and coercive power, 
instead of coercing others for one’s own sake, neoliberal positive liberty 
allows private individuals to impose, without consent, public restrictions 
for the sake of their private interests. Neoliberal positive liberty thus leads 
to the establishment of legal and political inequality: some command 
without consent, i.e., without restriction, while others obey without 
consent, i.e., without liberty. Ultimately, making use of the benefits of 
negative liberty depends on the (political) attribution to individuals of 
certain legal and political statuses, under which they can make use of their 
liberty.
Moreover, the positive liberty that underlies the spontaneous order not 
only deprives certain citizens of their share of the general well-being but 
also leaves no room to claim a right against that deprivation. Besides 
protecting negative liberty in the maximization of individuals’ well-being, 
this order does not provide any concrete rights. Hayek explicitly says that 
it “is meaningless to speak of a right in the sense of a claim on the 
spontaneous order” (Hayek, 1960, p. 102, II). Indeed, although framed by 
abstract rules, rights are always obtained under particular circumstances, 
i.e., in terms of differences between “individuals”, for example natural and 
social talents (Hayek, 1976; Nozick, 1974). Despite the interdependence of 
all individuals, individuals always remain separate unities and are thus 
deprived of the right to claim a common share of the fruits of their 
relationships—as if belonging to a common body entailed personal 
indifference and the abandonment of private interests. Accordingly, if the 
Great Society, which replaces the will of the people, does not provide 
rights to citizens, and if those citizens do not obtain them from their 
private interactions, it is meaningless to claim such a right or to complain 
that such a right has been denied them. There is nothing to claim or to 
complain about. In other words, where there are no rights, there can be no 
deprivation of rights.
Even if individuals wish to complain about the deprivation of their rights, 
the neoliberal state—which considers such rights imaginary, fictitious, 
mystical—does not contain institutions that can address such complaints. 
Under the neoliberal state, both the people and public institutions vanish 
into thin air. As Beck stresses with regard to neoliberal globalization, 
neoliberalism is the power of Nobody (Beck 2002). Alluding to 
Odysseus’s clever escape from the cyclops Polyphemus in the Odyssey 
(Homer, 1996, 9, pp. 414–455), Beck suggests that the Nobody created 
under neoliberalism does not establish, protect or enforce equal individual 
rights. Even though Nozick (unlike Hayek) accepts the existence of natural 
rights and liberties, his rejection of a public person and public restrictions 
shows that the assumption of natural rights does not guarantee their 
enjoyment. In other words, when the will of the people becomes a mirage, 
individuals’ natural rights are also rendered illusory, as the neoliberal 
spontaneous society illustrates. Accordingly, instead of allowing for the 
“creat(ion of) conditions likely to improve the chances of all in the pursuit 
of their aims” (Hayek, 1976, p. 2), private restrictions on liberty deprive 
certain citizens of the chance to pursue their aims (Brown, 2015; Gill, 
1998; Hall, 2011; Klein, 2007; Overbeek, 1993; Stiglitz, 2013, 2016). 
Instead of protecting individual liberty, the rejection of the “fairy tale” of 
the people allows for the emergence of two familiar political statuses, 
originally deployed in neoliberal political society: those who live under 
free self-serfdom on the one hand and the invisible and voiceless on the 
other.
Free self-serfdom and voiceless persons
A free serf is someone who, although deprived of political 
protection—whether this is understood as it was in the medieval era 
(Bloch, 1961), which made a distinction between the protector and the 
protected, or as it was understood in the liberal tradition (Locke, 1679 
(1960); Kant, 1793 (1977)), in which each person is simultaneously 
protector and protected—can still satisfy their bodily needs through selling 
themselves or their labor. Neoliberal private restrictions on liberty cannot 
override the unrestricted autocratic deliberation of those who, in the 
absence of public law, can freely renounce their liberty in situations of 
extreme need, thus voluntarily enslaving themselves. The rejection of a 
public limit to individual liberty, along with the overlapping of public law 
and private interests, allows for unrestricted orders and, correlatively, for 
obedience without liberty (on work precariousness see Gill and Pratt, 
2008; on work conditions in sweat shops, see Bales 1999). Consequently, 
neoliberal political theory and practice allow for the creation of a situation 
in which some citizens (serfs) only obey while others (lords) only 
command.
One may argue that despite social and economic differences, along with 
their non-negligible impact on individual liberty (Marx 2000; Rawls, 
1971), neoliberalism’s Great or Open Society is not compatible with 
serfdom. Regardless of the lack of clear political criteria for defining an 
individual’s legal and political status (Bloch, 1961), human relationships 
have evolved under conditions of legal and political inequality (for 
example the superior free person vs. the inferior serf or vassal). This legal 
and political inequality is at work, for example, in systems where lords 
offer protection in exchange for total obedience (on the part of serfs and 
vassals) (Bloch, 1961). From the perspective of neoliberal theory, we are 
all equal: neoliberal society does not contain legal or political inequality 
and does not divide citizens into those who are superior and those who are 
inferior. It also does not include “protective relationships” or juridical and 
political obligations. To be at the disposal of someone else who can do 
whatever they please and to whom one owes unrestricted obedience entails 
neither that one has an inferior legal status nor that the political 
relationship at stake is one of a superior to an inferior. Persons have the 
same legal constitutional status (they all are seen as equally free), and all 
are equally entitled to pursue their private interests. Even if people sell 
themselves, this concerns the private restriction of liberty from the 
perspective of neoliberalism and does not conflict with the conditions 
required for the proper functioning of the spontaneous order, i.e., with 
individuals’ private liberty. Still, the private scope of individuals’ mutual 
service—the forbidding of serving others for the sake of those others’ 
well-being—does not prevent a person’s serving another as a means of 
ensuring their own private well-being, in which case it would not be 
appropriate to understand their relationship in terms of servant and 
seignior.
Besides entailing what is known in political philosophy as the liberty of 
slaves, i.e., the liberty of choosing either to comply with the orders of the 
master or to be beaten to death, the privatization of the well-being that 
results from individuals’ cooperation is based on the coercive restriction of 
liberty, under which some obey without liberty and others command 
without restriction. Thus, even if in neoliberal spontaneous societies 
people are not assigned explicitly different political statuses, which entail 
different political rights and duties, neoliberal political society does not 
prevent people from becoming servile or, correlatively, from becoming 
despotic. This fact reveals the extent to which neoliberalism entails a 
dangerous process of what some authors have called refeudalization 
(Supiot, 2013; Szalai, 2017), full analysis of which deserves examination 
of its own.
Nevertheless, when obeying without liberty, if citizens fail to acquire their 
rights they risk becoming something less than a free serf, i.e., a free 
excluded citizen. A free excluded citizen is a citizen who lives in a free 
society without having the personal, social or institutional resources to 
make use of their own liberty. When the neoliberal spontaneous order does 
not provide any concrete rights, and when another’s wellbeing has no 
bearing on one’s own, one is unrestrictedly free to pursue one’s own 
wellbeing even to the detriment of others unilaterally (the fully alienated 
person can be thrown away). In this case, voiceless and invisible citizens 
can only enjoy purely negative liberty, in the absence of the personal, 
social and institutional resources with which they might otherwise achieve 
well-being. Neoliberalism also entails the continuous risk of passing from 
servile (or docile) citizenship into lawless personhood. As such, 
individuals’ social existence is excluded from the neoliberal subjectivation 
procedure itself (in which human beings make themselves and are made 
subjects, Foucault, 2008).
Neoliberalism does not reduce to fostering the entrenchment of political 
inequality: the division of citizens into those who obey and those who 
command. It also does not merely imply a situation in which some are 
protected by the state while others are not, where private interests have a 
monopoly on legal protection and rights while others are denied political 
protection and only have duties (on work precariousness see Gill and Pratt, 
2008). Similarly, it does not exclusively entail political arbitrariness; the 
private reduction of the “public” law allows for the unilateral institution of 
the rules (or their revocation). Ultimately, neoliberalism risks leading to 
the total exclusion of some citizens under the veil of full liberty. The 
vanishing of the will of the people results in the invisibility of certain 
kinds of people, who are then forced to live in the spontaneous society as if 
they were stateless or lawless persons.
It is true that under the distinction between neoliberal theoretical premises 
and neo-liberal practice individuals’ lack of protection does not correspond 
to these extreme cases. There is a distinction between neoliberal theoretical 
premises and neoliberal governmental laws within the many versions of the 
welfare state, for example neoliberalism’s reshaping of previous (welfare) 
state policies along neoliberal lines (Kus, 2006). Neoliberalism has 
retained some of the elements of that state (such as the protection of the 
rights of the most vulnerable), although these elements have been reshaped 
by the market approach to social welfare (Hartman, 2005; MacLeavy, 
2016). On this basis, neoliberal officials have assigned public goods and 
services to private market providers, redesigning social programs to 
address the needs of neoliberal labor markets rather than personal 
wellbeing and establishing partnerships between the state and the private 
sector (Brodie, 2007).
Moreover, some argue that neoliberalism’s market approach to social 
welfare was an attempt to overcome certain economic and social 
difficulties of the welfare state. For example, economic 
internationalization has affected the competitive viability of the welfare 
state (Boyer and Drache, 1996; Rhodes, 1996). Also, the expansion of the 
state weakened intermediate groups and jeopardized individual liberties, 
subjecting citizens to increasing bureaucratic controls (Alber, 1988). We 
shall not dwell on a full analysis of these developments. The neoliberal 
market approach is, however, incompatible with the very idea of a welfare 
state. Indeed, despite the differences between the socialist, conservative 
and liberal versions of that state (Esping-Andersen, 1990), welfare states 
protect social rights, such as the right to education and health, and 
therefore provide social policies to enforce them (Marshall, 1950; Esping-
Andersen, 1990), such that “[t]he provided service, not the purchased 
service, becomes the norm of the social welfare” (Marshall, 1950, p. 309). 
Moreover, the functioning of the welfare state requires the contribution of 
fellow citizens (Marshall, 1950; Esping-Andersen, 1990). By contrast, the 
market approach rejects in principle all social rights, such as the right to 
education and health, and requires that individual welfare be an 
exclusively private enterprise (Brodie, 2007; MacLeavy, 2016). Instead of 
being provided, such services ought to be purchased (Brodie, 2007; 
MacLeavy, 2016).
Moreover, if the economic market only identifies solvable needs, and if 
individuals cannot signal their lack of resources, the neoliberal welfare 
state cannot prevent individuals who have been deprived of their rights 
from becoming invisible, along with the resulting institutionalized 
insecurity (Brodie, 2007), intensified poverty and inequality, and 
diminishing of security of employment and income for many wage earners 
(Clayton and Pontusson, 1998; Stiglitz, 2013). If the spontaneous society 
and its governments do not provide any rights, and if individuals do not 
acquire them in the economic market, there is no reason to claim such 
rights (including social rights). In this case, neoliberal social welfare 
reduces to charity (Clayton and Pontusson, 1998; Raddon, 2008; Mendes, 
2003). Under this reduction, neoliberal theory fosters individuals’ 
dependence on the private goodwill of citizens who, after legislating with 
their own interests in mind, and after denying others the right to enjoy the 
fruits of their own contributions, then establish government spending as a 
“free lunch” of sorts (all the while paradoxically arguing that “government 
spending is no free lunch” (Barro, 2009); see Nozick’s, (1974) defense of 
charity)). The neoliberal conception of welfare also shows how neoliberal 
theory and practice do not prevent the subordination of certain individuals 
to non-consensual external mastery.
Neoliberalism is equally committed to state retrenchment or permanent 
austerity (Whiteside, 2016). By requiring fiscal consolidation, cuts to 
social security, the privatization of public property, the liberalization of 
collective bargaining, and the shrinking of pensions (Barro, 2009), 
austerity not only undermines all attempts to establish social security but 
also challenges the liberal and democratic basis of society. First, neoliberal 
austerity neglects people’s well-being. A Portuguese neo-liberal politician 
declared in 2013 that even if under austerity measures the well-being of the 
people had worsened, the country was better off . The fact that neo-liberal 
policies have improved the state market is more relevant than the fact that 
the Portuguese people have been neglected and severely harmed (Legido-
Quigley et al. 2016; Oxfam Case Study, 2013).
Second, neoliberalism excludes in principle the will of the people, i.e., it 
obliges citizens to obey private laws to which they have not consented. 
Consequently, it excludes citizens’ rejection of its harmful effects, such as 
poverty and inequality, and rejects all appeals to alternative policies. 
Following the political referendum of 2015, for example, where the people 
voted against neoliberal politics of austerity , the Greek government 
nonetheless imposed a third harsh and austere economic program .
Accordingly, neoliberal political principles, embedded in austerity 
policies, cannot prevent certain citizens from becoming invisible and 
voiceless citizens, i.e., Nobodies. As voiceless citizens, their preferences 
can only be registered through illiberal and antidemocratic channels, such 
as populism. Only following the election of US President Trump did the 
deteriorating life conditions of American citizens living in the rust belt 
states of Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin become widely known 
(Walley, 2017). Treated as nothing, and having becoming Nobodies, these 
citizens face the oppressive and violent institutional neoliberal Nobody, 
with its no less violent and oppressive political body.
The rise of populism
There is a lack of consensus on the definition of populism (Collier, 2001). 




(Weyland, 2001) and ideology (Freeden, 2016; MacRae, 1969; Mudde, 
2013; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013). The organizational perspective of 
populism stresses the importance of the personal leader, who bases his or 
her power on direct, unmediated, and institutionalized relationships with 
unorganized followers (Weyland, 2001). In turn, as an ideology, i.e., a set 
of beliefs, values, attitudes, and ideas, populism combines (not always 
coherently and clearly) political, economic, social, moral, and cultural 
features with several characteristics that appear together, such as emphasis 
on the leader’s charisma: “the populist can demand the highest principles 
in the behavior, moral and political, of others while being absolved him or 
herself from such standards” (MacRae, 1969, p. 158). Beyond these 
features, however, and despite the fact that the concept of the “pure” 
people and the corrupted elite can be framed in different ways (Canovan, 
1999), the pure and homogenous people and the corrupt and homogenous 
elites are core concepts that underlie populist ideology (Mudde, 2004).
Since neo-liberal officials do not consider citizens’ and peoples’ political 
claims and are not entitled to address the political, economic, and social 
consequences of their policies, the perception that neo-liberal politicians 
are corrupt elites has been on the increase (Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2013). 
This has helped populist leaders to replace neo-liberal politicians, allowing 
populism to fill the emptiness that has resulted from the failure of those in 
power to address the people’s claims.
Although the relationship between neoliberalism and populism deserves its 
own examination, the exclusion of the people, along with the right to 
reciprocal coercion, is a point of tacit agreement between neoliberalism 
and anti-liberal, anti-democratic political forces (Weyland, 1999). Populist 
leaders have employed modern, rational models of economic 
liberalism—such as fiscal consolidation, cuts to social security, the 
privatization of public property, the liberalization of collective bargaining, 
and the shrinking of pensions to undermine intermediary associations, 
entrenched bureaucrats and rival politicians who seek to restrict their 
personal latitude, to attack influential interest groups, politicians, and 
bureaucrats, and to combat the serious crises in Latin America and Eastern 
Europe in the 1980s (Weyland, 1999). In turn, neoliberal experts use 
populist attacks on special interests to combat state interventionism and 
view the rise of new political forces, including populists, as crucial for 
determined market reform (Weyland, 1999). We therefore ought to be 
careful not to criticize neoliberal authoritarianism while neglecting the 
hidden powers that secretly support neoliberalism’s disdain for the people, 
such as mafias (Schneider and Schneider, 2007). Indeed, those who do so 
may take pleasure in seeing the blame for authoritarianism fall exclusively 
on the shoulders of neoliberal theory and practice, even though they too 
endorse a form of governance and the administration of the state apparatus 
that does away with the people.
When individuals’ relationships evolve in the absence of the people and of 
laws to protect against despotic and abusive power, an increase in illiberal 
and antidemocratic forms of resistance to neoliberal policies can only be 
expected (Gill, 1995; Hickel, 2016). As Locke, (1679 (1960): II, p. 225) 
put clearly:
Great mistakes in the ruling part, many wrong and 
inconvenient Laws, and all the slips of human frailty will be 
born by the People, without mutiny or murmur. But if a 
long train of Abuses, Prevarications, and Artifices, all 
tending the same way, make the design visible to the 
People, and they cannot but feel, what they lie under, and 
see, whither they are going; ’tis not to be wonder’d, that 
they should then rouze themselves, and endeavour to put 
the rule into such hands, which may secure to them the ends 
for which Government was at first erected.
If we accept that (a) impoverishment and inequality are on the increase; (b) 
governments are refusing to provide political remedies for this 
impoverishment; (c) and citizens’ political choices are being neglected in a 
long series of abuses, it is not surprising that voiceless citizens may try to 
put the ruling power into illiberal hands that will achieve the purpose for 
which government was first established: securing the common public good. 
Under the neoliberal transformation of private rules into public rules, 
citizens are witnessing a continuous disregard for their collective well-
being (see the relationship between the election of Donald Trump and the 
deteriorating life conditions of American citizens living in the rust belt 
states of Michigan, Pennsylvania and Wisconsin; Walley, 2017).
Instead of welcoming populist reactions, however, we should be clear that 
the anti-liberal and antidemocratic hijacking of the citizens’ revolt against 
neoliberalism in no way respects the need for public rules. A call for the 
establishment and protection of public law is a call for personal and 
institutional liberal and democratic sovereignty, which differs 
fundamentally from populism and the neoliberal model of sovereignty 
(Dean, 2015; Foucault, 2008). This claim also rejects the political (and 
nightmarish) choice between neoliberalism and populism. Indeed, even if 
the relationship between liberal democracy and populism deserves 
investigation of its own, liberal and democratic sovereignty does away 
with the distinction between the pure and homogenous people against 
corrupt and homogenous elites. It also rejects the idea of the personal and 
benevolent leader/protector, who bases their power on direct, unmediated, 
and institutionalized relationships with unorganized followers.
First, although the distinction between corrupt elites and the pure people 
rightly points to the problem of the legitimacy of the rulers’ power, the 
people is not a homogeneous or pure body, whatever the criterion of 
belonging (ethical, ethnic, racial, economic). Far from referring to an 
undifferentiated and homogeneous corpus, the people is a heterogeneous 
political body, which includes gender, racial, and economic differences 
(along with disagreement about personal and collective ends), and which 
ultimately entails non-alienable individual rights and duties (Locke, 1679 
(1960); Kant, 1793 (1977); Sieyes, 1789 (1989)).
Second, the solution to this gap is not its elimination through the 
immediate relationship between the leader and the pure, homogeneous 
people. In the liberal political tradition, there is no immediate political 
power. Rawls’s, (1993) political liberalism, for example, points to the gap 
between the political principles of society (e.g., the principles of justice), 
which are embedded in its basic political institutions (e.g., constitutions) 
and in “executive” institutions (parliaments, courts, governments), and the 
individuals in everyday life. Accordingly, the sovereignty of the people 
ultimately means that, whether at the political, local, national, 
international, or global level, citizens’ relationships are always mediated 
by law embedded in their public institutions (Locke, 1679 (1960); Kant, 
1793 (1977); Rawls, 1993).
Even if there are many points of ideological disagreement concerning the 
concept of the people, sparked mainly by its use by controversial figures 
from the standpoint of liberalism, such as Rousseau’s concept of the 
general will, in Locke’s and Kant’s political philosophy the sovereignty of 
the people does not mean that the people can pursue its immediate and 
unbridled wishes. A charter of rights or constitutional principles always 
binds the will of the people (Locke, 1679 (1960); Kant, 1793 (1977)). In 
the absence of such restrictions, the people can itself become a despot, a 
danger which has been acknowledged since at least the time of Aristotle, 
(2002; see also Cicero 1999; Locke, 1679 (1960); Rawls, 1971, 1993).
Third, in Locke’s and Kant’s political philosophies, the protective role of 
the people aims to ensure a political society of free and equal persons, not 
a society of minor and inferior subjects who need benevolent protectors, 
such as populist leaders (see Locke’s claim concerning the constitutional 
protection of individuals’ political rights (Locke, 1679 (1960)) and Kant’s 
rejection of paternalistic and despotic political power (1793 (1977)).
Liberal theory challenges the underlying neoliberal and populist 
Manichean opposition between personal interests and the general will of 
the people (“either there is a general will or individual liberty is 
repressed”, “if there is individual liberty, the general will is excluded”). If, 
when protecting the homogenous people against corrupt elites, populists 
endorse the first alternative, and if the neoliberal exclusion of the people 
corresponds to the second, both approaches remain blind to the political 
responsibility of free persons. Ultimately, whether by imposing on others 
the unrestrictedly and selfish pursuit of well-being or by appealing to the 
unlimited will of the people, both undermine individuals’ political 
freedom.
For these reasons, personal and institutional liberal and democratic 
sovereignty is more than a childish claim to state protection against 
political irresponsibility and blindness to public contributions to individual 
private well-being. It is a claim to one’s own political responsibility, for 
oneself and others, as this claim is clearly formulated in Locke’s and 
Kant’s political philosophies.
The social safety net
Although Locke’s and Kant’s political philosophies do not require 
individuals under public law to positively foster others’ social, economic 
and cultural well-being, their perspectives on the public challenge 
indifference towards the increasing poverty and inequality that we are 
currently witnessing under neoliberalism (Greer, 2014; Stiglitz, 2013). 
They also speak against the state authoritarianism that neoliberalism 
engenders (Brown, 2015; Bruff, 2014; Kreuder–Sonnen and Zangl, 2015; 
Orphanides, 2014; Schmidt and Thatcher, 2014). Of course, we may 
disagree on the extent of the success or failure of Locke’s and Kant’s 
theoretical political constructions of a political personality, understood in 
analogy with a single body. Some criticize the illiberal nature of Kant’s 
general will (for example the representatives’ betrayal of the people’s 
interest in the liberal social contract; Badiou, 2016). Nevertheless, these 
weaknesses challenge neither individual liberty, nor the people, nor the 
inter-protective role of the people and public law. Indeed, they remind us 
of the political meaning of ‘the body politic’.
Despite their strong commitment to the protective role of the people, along 
with their awareness of our political responsibility for the fairness of the 
public rules that affect us all, Locke and Kant do not fully explain the 
necessity of the notion of the people when it comes to producing a social 
safety net created by the will of the sovereign people. They also do not 
consider democratic procedures for arriving at collective support for a 
social safety net. With the differences between ancient and modern 
democracies acknowledged (Bobbio, 1988), the fact that Locke and Kant 
endorse democracy’s core feature, the existence of a people (the entire 
body of citizens) with a right to make collective decisions (Bobbio, 1988), 
does not make them democrats, at least in our modern sense (Bobbio, 
1988).
Following our premises, and acknowledging the various ways in which 
globalization impacts states and people, democratic governments should 
establish democratic procedures at the national and international level to 
secure collective support for the political and social safety net. These 
include public laws based on the will of the people that provide each 
person with a unique set of liberties with regard to the use of material 
goods which impose on each a unique set of restrictions. These liberties 
and restrictions will ensure that individuals have an equal coercive power
to prevent their becoming servile persons and, correlatively, to prevent any 
one of them from becoming a despotic lord. They also require the 
assumption of the cooperative nature of individual well-being, and 
therefore the pursuit of social justice with regards to the fruits of that 
cooperation. The political translation of the common right to the results of 
social cooperation through public policies that protect social rights, such as 
the right to education and health, is also desirable. This requires the “direct 
or indirect participation of citizens, and the greatest possible number of 
citizens, in the formation of laws” (Bobbio, 1988, p. 38). Again, it is 
necessary to recast the political principle of provided (not purchased) 
services as a norm of public and social welfare. Finally, it requires 
awareness of the fact that in the absence of a political body to protect and 
enforce individual liberties, individuals will lack the personal, social and 
institutional resources to make use of their own liberty.
Conclusion
We have shown that neoliberalism’s rejection of the existence of the 
people seriously harms individual private liberty and does not prevent the 
transformation of the majority of free individuals into servile persons. 
More specifically, we have shown that forbidding the public restriction of 
liberty (which is inherent in the concept of the people) while exclusively 
defending private restrictions of liberty (a) deprives the majority of 
citizens of the equal right of coercion, and therefore of equal liberty, and 
(b) promotes the rise of different political statuses, a division between 
those who obey and those who command. We have also shown that 
neoliberalism lacks the resources to prevent the total alienation of liberty.
In comparing neoliberalism to Locke and Kant’s political philosophies, we 
have shown how the protective role of the people is compatible with 
individual liberty. Since it requires an equal right of coercion, it allows for 
the protection of individual liberty. We have also shown that this is not an 
exclusively collective task. It also depends on each citizen. In Locke’s and 
Kant’s political philosophies, the protective role of the people aims to 
ensure that political society is free and equal, not a society of minor and 
inferior subjects who need benevolent protectors (Locke, 1679 (1960)); 
Kant, (1793 (1977)). We concluded that, against neoliberalism’s faith in 
the powers of the spontaneous order, individual political autonomy 
depends on the public safeguarding of liberties. We also pointed out that 
unless there is a political turn toward the acknowledgement of the people 
or peoples, along with recognition of the significance of their political 
deliberation, neo-liberalism cannot be separated from illiberal and 
antidemocratic political choices. Similarly, if individuals’ relationships 
evolve beyond the existence of the people and lack laws to protect against 
despotic and abusive power, we cannot prevent the development of slavish 
and servile relationships among citizens. The fact that these relationships 
remain politically forbidden in neoliberal states, for example in the 
European Union, only reveals that neoliberalism’s dismantling of liberal 
and democratic political institutions has not fully succeeded. In the 
absence of the people, human rights depend exclusively on individuals’ 
interests; the spontaneous order thus cannot prevent neoliberalism from 
descending into slavery and serfdom, i.e., self-slavery and self-serfdom.
Future research should ascertain how, in the aftermath of neoliberalism’s 
devastating social and political effects on public cohesion, it might be 
possible to reconstitute a sense of political belonging (Habermas, 2008) 
and the sovereignty of the people (Pyke, 2001) under globalization.
Future research should also continue to evaluate the dangerous process of 
what many are calling refeudalization under neoliberalism (Supiot, 2013; 
Szalai, 2017). It is worth comparing the feudal alienation of political 
liberty, for example the different perspectives on vassalage (Bloch, 1961), 
with contemporary forms of inferior political status.
Finally, future research could evaluate how, as a reaction to the 
disenchantment with the rise of bureaucracy identified by Weber, (1978), 
neoliberalism might express a kind of re-enchantment with the exclusively 
individual rational actor, who claims a non-alienable space of liberty 
against the bureaucratic “iron cage”.
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